Socrates and Plato - Session 23 (19 February 2002)

What follows in this paper is rather difficult. I would like to take your views. Would you like to pass through difficult passage or passages? It's like a gymnasium. You have done some exercise and there comes a point when you have to do a harder exercise. I would encourage you to do the harder exercise but I need your consent. If you would like to go to another topic, it’s also a good topic and go from easy to slightly difficult and slightly difficult and gradually we can come back to this again afterwards so that is also another way. There are two alternatives for you. You have done Plato sufficiently although it is only a few pages that you have read. What I have told you of Plato is quite a great deal. What I learnt after two years I have given you within a few pages so that is the advantage of the new generation, you get the benefit of your predecessors who have taken long to crystallise for you and give you. I had to plod a lot; I had no teacher to whom I could go and ask to give me a special lecture on Plato. I had to read a lot, understand the background, even though few ideas were there but very difficult for me to understand and it took me time and then I reflected on this for nearly fourteen years so you are getting the benefit of fourteen years of reflection on what Plato had said. So it is good even for me it is good because you know when you share your reflections with a group of people like you, you feel very happy. So it’s for me all a profit but now we have come to a point where I should right in the beginning tell you that now the passages are more difficult and climbing is difficult. If you like, you can go slowly, only one paragraph or two paragraphs at the most, that is one way or I switch over to another topic similar one and again come back afterwards when we are a little more trained in philosophical thinking. So I give you a choice and tell me what you feel inwardly. That’s the second…It will make a difference and we will come back afterwards…We can come back afterwards first if possible. You know it is like a steep climb or you go round this and come up, both are alternatives, both are good. You want to go straight up. We go up, alright, fine. So let us see then I am very pleased. So let us read on the next page. You got a text.

Obviously, one feels here the limitations of Plato’s theory. A self–existent which is non–existent is self–contradiction; it is inconceivable and therefore something that cannot be. If it is really non–existent what is it that partakes of the Ideas? And can the non–existent ever attain to being? Plato would say that perhaps it cannot and it does not and therefore it is neither being nor non–being; object not of knowledge but only of opinions. It is a mere appearance. But still, if it is an appearance, it must in some sense be. And if it is, it must be related to the Ideas and by that relation would form a unity of a total existence of Reality.

Now this is the summary of what I told you yesterday so this is not so difficult. Now the next paragraph is slightly difficult let us see. There are several other difficulties too with respect to this theory. In fact, Plato himself is aware of them. And this is very interesting; it’s not that Plato was so unconscious that he allowed his own ideas without admitting his own limits; that is a mark of greatness; a great man saying: Look, my own theory which I have advanced, is defective. Indeed, we find that he puts in his Parmenides certain objections to his own theory of Ideas.

Parmenides is one of his dialogues where Parmenides is the main speaker and Socrates is a younger man. So Socrates is expounding his Theory of Ideas and Parmenides laughs at it and says: you are too young. There are many difficulties in what you are saying. So actually Palo himself writing, it means he himself criticising his own theory through the mouth of Parmenides, it’s the greatness of the philosopher. Now: The first argument relates to this question whether the particular partakes of the whole Idea or only of a part.

Now let’s concentrate on this: does the particular partake of the whole idea or only of a part? Does a cat partake of the whole idea of cattiness or only a part of the idea of cattiness; it’s a very interesting question. If a cat is a cat it must be wholly a cat it can’t be partly a cat and partly a lion so the answer would be normally it partakes of the universal, it must partake of the whole of the universal, you can’t say it is partly a cat and partly not a cat, it is wholly a cat and it can be only whole of cattiness is present in the cat. Although it is one cat but it partakes the whole of the cattiness, right this is the question that is put. Question is: does the particular partake of the whole idea or a part of the idea? It is argued that if it is the former, one thing is at many places at once.

If it is argued that the whole is partaken then the same thing is present at many places. If you partake the whole of it then the whole of it is there therefore you are at many places it may seem strange because we only see one cat at one place but if partakes of the whole of the idea then wherever the idea is it must be present there also.

..If the latter, the Idea is divisible, and it is a very important question. Is the idea divisible or indivisible? If partaking is only a part of the whole then it means that the whole is divisible, sum of cattiness is here another part of the cattiness is another cat, third part of cattiness is another part so it means that the whole is divisible and then he gives an example. ..And a thing which is a part of smallness will be smaller than the absolute smallness, which is absurd. This is an argument you have to grasp in a sense it is a very easy argument but the expression of it is difficult therefore it creates a difficulty in the mind. Let us read twice–thrice.

if the latter,

Latter means? If the particular partakes only of a part of the whole that is the latter. If a particular partakes a part of the whole then what will happen? You take the idea of smallness, now the idea of smallness will be very, very small you might say. Now the idea of smallness is partaken by small things then the small thing will be smaller than the smallness. If a small thing partakes only of a part of smallness then that small thing will be even less than that smallness itself and less than smallness is absurdity. Can there be smallest than the smallest? Can there be smaller than smallest? This is absurd, what can be smaller than smallest? Let us repeat both arguments, two alternatives. As I told you we are passing through a steep climb so we have to bear with the twists of the thought movement. Let us repeat the question. Does a particular partake of the whole of the idea or does it partake only of a part of the idea? This is the question, you must write down this question quite clearly. Does the particular, in philosophy we should read the same sentence ten times because every sentence is a very precise sentence and has to be dealt with precisely like a microscope? In science sometimes it is easier to teach a smaller thing because of your microscope, you can see with the microscope but in philosophy the same thing is difficult because ideas have to be seen only by ideas, we don’t have a microscope to see an idea. So our mind should become a microscope. So now let us see. Does a particular partake of the whole of the idea or only of a part of the idea this is the question. And remember one simple example; does a cat partake of the whole idea of cattiness or a cat partakes only of a part of the idea of cattiness? This is an example. Does it partake the whole idea of cattiness or a part of the idea of cattiness? It must be whole that should be the real answer so let us pursue that answer now. Prima facie a cat is a cat because it partakes of the whole of cattiness. So that is a very obvious answer let us see as we move forward. Now the argument is: if so there are two consequences logically. One if it is partaking of the whole then the whole is at many places because there are many cats and each cat is partaking of the whole; this can happen only if the whole is at many places but that is not admissible because according to Plato the whole is only one. One can be at many places only if there are many wholes. Cattiness partaken of here, cattiness partaken of by another cat there, the third cattiness partaken by another cat. If the same whole is partaken of by so many then this is the difficulty that this same thing will be at many places. How can one thing be at many places? The wholeness is a thing and if wholeness is partaken by hundreds of cats then wholeness must be at a hundred places, so how can one thing be at the same time be at a hundred places? This is the difficulty. Of course there is a catch in the argument, we will catch the argument but I can tell you how philosophically mind is exercised to its farther point. You can see that there is a catch in the argument but you have to catch it, you do it later on, not now you are only trying to understand the argument. If the whole is partaken by every particular then the whole must be at all the places. That particulars exist that would mean that the same thing which is a whole, same thing is at many places. So one thing can be present at many places is absurd. Fine, we shall think over it again, we shall come back again. Philosophical arguments have to be thought over again by revisiting. We will revisit the argument. There are philosophers who are revisiting their argument even after fifty years. Some arguments are so subtle it takes fifty years of thinking over them and coming back again and then finding: Oh! My Lord this is what we wanted to say. So we shall take time even to revisit them but anyway it should first of all register in the mind that there is an argument and we have first to understand the argument properly and re–reflect on it. In Sanskrit we have a very beautiful word which is called nirridhaysanam, nirridhaysanam means reflecting again and again and again and still again and yet again and further again that is nirridhaysanam. Vichar means thinking, nirridhaysanam is thinking again and again. You know before you have shakshatkara, you have to do nirridhaysanam. You have to do shravana, mannana, nirridhaysanam and shakshatkara. These are the four stages of realisation. First is shravana,first you hear then you think over what you hear then nirridhaysanam, you repeatedly think again and again, you powder that reality make it still, subtle and still subtler and still subtler then in a flash you realise, you grasp the experience. Sakshatkara realization. Sakshatkara comes from the word akshar, something that meets your eye, kara is an act, act in which sa aksha, something which meets your eye, you see God eye to eye, face to face then you come face to face that is sakshatkara there is no doubt because you have seen directly, there is no doubt about God because you have seen God face to face. If I see Betina face to face I say: I know Betina, no question. So that’s sakshatkara. So this is the process of nirridhaysanam we are doing, repeating again and again.

If the whole is partaken of by part wholly then that whole is at many places because the parts are at many places that would mean that the whole which is one thing is at many places. So that seems to be absurd, it may be absurd but you will find it’s not absurd but at least it seems that it gives you an idea that one thing can be at many places it seems to be contradictory of ordinary ideas. We know that one thing is always at one place. Fanny can’t be sitting here and in the garden at the same time she is at one place. So usually one thing is at one place but if a part partakes of the whole of the idea and since there are many parts then that whole which is one is at many places that seems opposed to our ordinary idea therefore it is absurd that is one consequence. The other alternative is there is b, you can again see the consequence of this. The whole of the idea, then the same thing will be at many places this is one consequence. If a part partakes only of a part of the idea, if a part partakes only of a part of the idea then it means that the whole is divisible and the whole is divisible and according to Plato the whole is not divisible that’s a part of the Theory of Ideas. Ideas are indivisible, they are not divisible. So if a part partakes only of a part of the idea then whole is divisible and then an example is given by Parmenides; supposing there is an idea of smallness just as in the idea of cattiness he takes an example of smallness, supposing there is an idea of smallness. Now smallness makes things small just a Cattiness makes a cat kept similarly smallness would make things small now if a small thing partakes of a part of smallness that small thing partakes of a part of the smallness then that small, that part will be smaller than smallness which is absurd this is the dilemma. Since Socrates could not answer this question, Parmenides said your Theory of Ideas is all not worth. We shall repeat this argument again. The argument is does a part partake partakes of the whole idea or a part of the idea? If it partakes of the whole of the idea then the same thing will be at many places which is absurd. If it partakes only of a part of the idea then idea is divisible which is contradictory of Plato’s Theory of Indivisibility of Ideas and taking an example of smallness—if a small thing partakes of a small part of an idea of smallness then that small will be smaller than smallness which is absurd therefore Plato’s theory of ideas is bombarded. You are not tired with this argument? Why, you can continue, good. Don’t feel tired, in philosophy one quality is not to be tired, don’t even see it is useless. Very often when you hear the arguments of philosophers you say: Oh! Uselessly they go on asking and discussing. It’s a misconception, philosophers do not discuss useless things, they are very important, and they may be wrong but not useless. Sometimes you say what is this smallness, smallness and all that divisible, indivisible these are not nonsensical ideas they are very important. They are not nonsensical ideas. Bear with these nonsensical ideas, go through them and ultimately when you grasp you find a great perception like a sun emerging as it were from the night. So we read these two sentences again. In subtle philosophy you should read again and again. When I used to read philosophy I used to take two hours to read one paragraph, if you want to read Socratic philosophy do not worry about the time. It may take two hours to read one paragraph, particularly when I was reading the philosophy of Spinoza, his argument used to be so subtle that it took time for me to understand his argument and the force of the argument; so it takes time so it doesn't matter we need to read it again and again to at least grasp what he says. The first argument relates to this question whether the particular partakes of the whole idea or only of a part. It is argued that if it is the former one is at many places at once, if the latter the idea is divisible and a thing which is a part of smallness will be smaller than absolute smallness, it is absurd.

Now we come to the second argument. The second argument is the same as Aristotle's argument of the third man. Aristotle was a pupil of Plato and although he was a pupil of Plato he did not agree with his master so he argued against his own master and that argument is called the argument of the third man but this argument was already anticipated by Plato himself. It’s not as if Aristotle discovered this argument he only emphasised the argument of Plato, his own argument against his own theory. This argument is called the argument of the third man, now let us see how it is.

It states that since there is similarity between the thing and the Idea of which it partakes, there must still be another Idea to explain this similarity; and if there is such another Idea, there will be similarity between these two, to explain this similarity between the two, to explain these two, to explain which there will be the need to posit a still further Idea and ad infinitum.

Let's read once or twice, it's a very important argument. I'll read once without explaining first then read again.

In philosophy whenever any argument ends in ad infinitum it means this argument is therefore the basic argument is defeated, it is called the argument of endless regress, you go on it is called the argument of endless regress if you go behind and behind and behind and behind, if it comes to the end the argument is complete but if it is endless regress where is the argument? If there were ends and therefore the argument was never made. Argument is made when the argument is complete but if the argument continues on and on and on and on and on and you know it never gets completed then the argument doesn't exist it never completes. An argument which is not complete is not an argument. So this argument is called an argument of endless regress. Now let us repeat the argument. There is a cat and there is a cat you call both of them are cats because they are similar to each other. Now if they are similar to each other it is because according to Plato there is an idea called cattiness which explains this similarity. This is Plato's theory that if one cat resembles another cat this similarity is because both the cats partake of the cattiness, fine. Now the question is, is there a similarity between cat and cattiness? There must be a similarity between cat and cattiness. Now this similarity becomes of what? There must be another kind of cattiness which is similar to these two. Now if there is similarity between this cattiness and this cattiness therefore there must be another cattiness and that is ad infinitum. If Deepti and Kireet are similar to each other there must be somebody who explains this similarity but then that one will also be similar to Deepti and similar to me. How do you explain this similarity between me and that third man? This is the further argument. So my similarity with the third man has to be explained for that if you require a fourth man then there will be similarity between that fourth man and the third man. this can be explained only if there is a fifth man then there is similarity between the fifth man and the fourth man that can be explained only if there is a sixth man, it will never end therefore the argument is absurd therefore the whole Theory of Ideas is absurd and mind you Plato himself is arguing this. His own Theory of Ideas he himself is putting arguments. Clear this idea, this third man argument. Let us repeat.

If there are two cats they are both called cats because they are similar to each other. By virtue of what are they similar to each other? By virtue of cattiness. If so then there is again a similarity between cattiness and the cat. How do I explain this similarity? There must be another kind of cattiness which explains this similarity, that is similar to this cattiness and the earlier cattiness and how do I explain the similarity between them? There must be a farther cattiness and so on it will never end and when the argument does not end the argument is not made, it does not complete itself. Therefore according to this argument the Theory of Ideas falls, it's not valid. There is a third argument. There is still a third argument which points out that since everything in the world has a corresponding idea there must be ideas corresponding to hell, mud and dirt as well. An argument which is rejected not only on any rational ground but only with indignation. If everything in the world has a corresponding idea then hell also must be a corresponding idea there must be a hell somewhere. If dirt exists there must be something like dirtness, there must be muddiness somewhere. Parmendes says this is absurd, there is no rational argument but this is absurd this is the third argument. Now comes the final argument.

According to a further argument if ideas are thoughts, thoughts must be of something and therefore they cannot be ultimate. If ideas are thoughts and thoughts are always of something then that thing must be ultimate, not ideas. Therefore Plato's argument that ideas are ultimate is rejected. Now to grasp this argument you must understand what is meant by ultimate? According to Plato ideas are ultimate or rather to be very fair to him, he says: that ideas are penultimate. There's a difference between ultimate and penultimate. Penultimate is not absolutely ultimate but lower than ultimate. So according to Plato there are many ideas which are penultimate but these ideas can be three ultimate ideas. So there are many ideas, a number of ideas, these ideas are Truth, Beauty and Goodness. All the ideas put together can be under three categories,—Truth, Beauty and Goodness. And these again can be combined into one idea—The Good and this good, The Good is ultimate. so this statement is not exactly correct. Most correct idea is 'Ideas are penultimate but the idea of The Good is ultimate'; this is Plato's theory. Ideas are penultimate but the idea of The Good is ultimate and what is the meaning of the ultimate? It is the highest that can be conceived, the highest that can be conceived is the ultimate beyond which there is nothing. You want a holiday tomorrow, how will you get the permission for a holiday tomorrow? Deepti is the ultimate authority to decide whether you should have a holiday or not. Supposing she says: you will not have a holiday. You want a holiday then you begin to ask if there is anybody higher than Deepti to whom you can go, so you go on to higher and higher and higher then you say now that is the highest. As in the case of a court case, you go to a court then you go to District Court which is higher court then you go to High Court which is still higher court and then you go to Supreme Court and once the Supreme Court says something,—final, ultimate, there is nothing higher than that. So ultimate means beyond which there is nothing, it is the highest.

Now the argument is then if the Idea of the Good is ultimate, you say this proposition is wrong is the argument. What is the argument? Idea is a thought, idea is a thought. Now the important point is that every thought is always a thought of something. You examine any thought, thought is always of something therefore points to something beyond itself therefore thought can never be ultimate, therefore Idea of the Good is not ultimate. So Plato's theory which says the idea of the good is ultimate is rejected. There are still some more arguments which however are not so important, these four arguments are important arguments. Let's repeat these four arguments.

The first argument is 'Does the part partake of the whole of the idea or only of the part of the idea?' You got it, you want something? If it partakes of the whole then the whole is at many places; which is absurd. If it partakes of a part of the idea then the whole is divisible, it is contrary to the idea of Plato and if there is an idea of smallness then a thing which is small will be smaller than then the smallness which is absurd. This is the first argument.

Second argument is that the Theory of Idea rests upon similarity between particulars. If one thing is similar to the other then that similarity is explained by an idea but then there is a similarity between particular and the universal to explain which you have to have another idea and then there will be similarity between one universal and the other universal therefore there is another universal that universal will be similar to the other universal therefore you need another universal and this ad infinitum therefore the argument falls.

The third argument is if everything in the world has a corresponding idea then there must be an idea of hell, idea of mud, idea of dirt which is a thing. And the fourth argument is 'Ideas are thoughts' and thoughts are always of something therefore thoughts can never be ultimate, therefore ideas are not ultimate. These are the four arguments on the basis of which Plato's Theory of Ideas is rejected by Plato himself and that is important. Plato himself rejects his own theory by his own arguments. Alright, we shall continue this tomorrow. Not tired, no? Right. It's a steep climb but don't worry. We shall be together, we shall repeat 10 times if necessary and yet crypto theory is… He holds his theory up to the end and even after rejection he does not give up the theory that is very important also. He rejects his own theory by his own arguments and yet he holds his theory. All right we shall repeat the four arguments tomorrow so try to remember it even if you don't remember don't worry, we shall do it again, all over again. I never burden the mind of the student. We shall repeat it again. It's only tomorrow, we don't have a class after that. Oh! Now you see.

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