Value may be conceived as an object, subjective or objective, the possession of which imparts to us a sense of fulfilment and therefore something we prize and cherish.
A value, understood, in the above sense, may be already possessed by us and which is maintained by us and what is naturally pursued by us for continuous maintenance or for a greater maximisation. In that context, value is an object that is desired and which is also pursued as something desirable on the ground that it is desired. Value is thus both positive and normative. The hedonist maintains that pleasure is desired, and thus he underlines psychological hedonism. But on that very ground, he argues that pleasure is desirable and should be normatively pursued.
But when the desirable is sought to be derived from what is desired, there is a possibility of committing what is called “naturalistic fallacy”, since there are a number of things which are desired but are not considered to be desirable. And this introduces in the concept of value several considerations which are not naturalistic but normative in character, and in the light of which value is conceived to be a normative concept.
These normative considerations emerge from two important facts. There is, first, the fact that no individual exists or can exist all by himself independent of the collectivity. And this calls upon every individual to relate with the collectivity in a way that is not positively natural but which is normative, requiring efforts that are not experienced to be necessarily spontaneous or pleasant.