Socrates and Plato - Session 18 (19 September 2001)

We shall now read the paper and you will find it not as difficult as it would have been if we had not prefaced it with a long talk on the subject. However we shall go very slowly with every paragraph. In fact we shall read every paragraph twice so that if you have any problems, any questions then you have time to ask. I am giving so much time to Plato because as I have told you that without Plato you will not understand the entire thought of the West, the entire history of Western philosophy. If you know Plato quite well, other things become easier to understand in the West. So let us now start.

The concept of the Good is the culmination of Plato’s philosophy. There is, according to Plato, a distinction between reality and appearance. The former is the universal and the permanent, the latter particular and transient; Let us repeat. What is universal and permanent? There are two words I have used. There is a distinction between reality and appearance. Now which one of them is universal and permanent?

Answer: Reality.

Good. Reality and what is particular and transient?

Answer: Appearance, good. Transient means, you write down the meaning of transient. Transcient means temporary that which passes away. Joys and sorrows of human life are transient. What does it mean? Joys and sorrows of human life are transient, Transient means that which is temporary that which passes away. It doesn’t remain. The Joys and sorrows of human life do not remain. Now you are joyous, now you are sorrowful. Again you are joyous, again sorrowful, all transient, passes away. The inner delight is permanent. There is in us a reality which is delightful permanently so that it is really real. Our joy and sorrows are appearances; they are transient.

The former is the object of true knowledge. What is the meaning of the former and the latter? You know the use of these two terms—the former and the latter, let us understand. Whenever there are two words written one after the other—here are two words written, reality and appearance these are the two words. Now when you refer to the reality, you say it is the former, when you refer to appearance here it is the latter that which comes afterwards. So when it is said the former is the object of true knowledge that means the former refers to.….. Good. The former is the object of true knowledge. The latter either the object of imagination or opinion, the latter means? Appearance. Good. The former is the object of true knowledge, the latter, the object of either imagination or opinion , latter means the world has to be perceive according to Plato is relative and therefore incapable of being known absolutely and therefore truly that is that you cannot truly understand the world as it is, as it appears to all of us. Particulars according to him possess contradictory qualities. You take any particular, the same object is beautiful from one point of view, ugly from another point of view. You take the most beautiful object; it depends upon the angle at which you look at it. You look at it from another angle, the same object appears to be not so beautiful. So every particular object has contradictory qualities. That which is cold is from another point of view hot, if it is supposing you have touched ice in the first place and then you touch a cool place it will seem warm because the first experience of your coolness was that of ice, icy cold. The next one is cool, not so cold so that which is cool seems to be warm if it is touched after you touch a very cold place. Similarly that which is warm, what you call warm is cool depending upon the experience that you had previously. If you have touched a very warm thing and then you touch a warm thing then it will be cool. So the same object is hot and cold, contradictory depending upon your previous experience. The same object seems to be pleasant and yet painful depending upon your previous experience. If somebody had lived in a house of a tyrant where every day there is a kind slavery and even somebody is beaten up by the tyrant. Now suddenly the slave is transferred to another place where the master is not tyrannical then he will find this going together to be heavenly; although the truly heavenly would be altogether quite different depending upon your previous experience and when you compare the previous experience with the present experience you find to be somebody to be kind or cruel. You know modern children are so much loved by their parents that even a little scolding by a parent, the child feels the mother or father has done a great injustice to it, even a slight slap by a parent gives the child the experience of tremendous cruelty; Oh! I have been beaten, the child says. This is because modern children do not know how much their parents were beaten up by their parents. And therefore in comparison they do not know what it is, a mere scolding, a little scolding the child feels tremendously hurt. So that mild scolding will be felt very pleasant if he had experienced the kind of treatment which the parents of the modern children had experienced from their parents. So I knew for example our teachers used to beat us on our hands almost every day. We have this experience and now we see the children being treated. We feel the children are so kindly treated you can’t imagine. I remember when I used to make one mistake in writing or dictation the teacher used to say: now you hold out your hand and there would come a cane straight on my hand and five canes for one mistake, ten canes for two mistakes and so on multiply the mistakes and then you have multiplication of canes. This was the condition of the school not long ago. But now even a light cane even would mean tremendous cruelty which is true actually, I agree with the children of today, there should be no cruelty, no punishment of this kind at all. but you can see what Plato says is that the same thing is good or bad depending upon your previous experience, it is relative, it is contradictory from one point of view, it is kind; from another point of view it is cruel. Particulars according to him possess contradictory qualities; a thing which you might call beautiful has some elements of ugliness too. It is not pure and ideal and unmixed beauty. What is smaller as compared to one thing is bigger as compared to another. The same thing a person is told as compared to many others if the others are comparatively smaller but the same person is called to be small if there is a comparison with taller people. So the same thing is at once small and tall. It is therefore at once small and bigger, it is relative. This word relative is very important.

What is relative? Relative is that which changes its quality depending upon the relationship it has with which it is compared as distinguished from absolute. Absolute is what it remains irrespective of any comparison you make, it is absolute. When you say it is absolutely perfect it means you compare it with anything, it is perfect that is the absolute that which remains the same in spite of any comparison that is absolute. But that which changes its character depending upon the relationship with others it is relative. Finally particulars are constantly in the flux and therefore constantly change their nature they are therefore being, non–being. It’s a peculiar word which has been coined by Plato—they are being, non–being. As I’ve told you things which are in flux as long as they are seen they are being but the next moment they disappear therefore they become non–being, so they are being, non–being. All things which are in flux are being, non–being. Particulars are according to Plato the objects of perceptions and perception he contends is not knowledge. In his dialogue ‘Theaetetus’ he points out that comparison, knowledge of existence and understanding of numbers are essential to knowledge but they cannot be perceived by senses. I have spoken of this last time we shall repeat this sentence because it is a very important sentence.

There is a dialogue in which Plato has written the title of the dialogue is ‘Theaetetus’. Now Plato has written about forty dialogues. We had come across two of his dialogues when you were reading Socrates. You might have forgotten the two names but I shall remind you, one is called ‘Charmides’, the other is called ‘Lychees’ these are the two names I have spoken of when I was reading with you Socrates. His theory of ‘Virtue is Knowledge’, where we had discussed two dialogues ‘Charmides’ and ‘Lychees’ ’. Now similarly we spoke of ‘the Republic’ is also a very big dialogue written by him and one portion of that dialogue we read yesterday from Plato. Now this is another dialogue he has written called ‘Theaetetus’. Now in that dialogue he points out that comparison, knowledge of existence and understanding of numbers are essential for knowledge but they cannot be perceived by senses.

I had told you last time about similarity. That was one example I gave you of similarity, when two things appear to be similar to each other. Now all similarities depend upon comparison, unless you compare one with the other, you cannot decide whether it is similar or not. Now comparison is done by what that is the question, by what means do you compare? According to Plato, you cannot compare by senses. Your senses can only perceive an object as it is but your senses cannot compare one with the other. Take for example how you compare sound and colour? Sound is judged by the ear and colour is judged by the eye. Now in what sense do you compare colour and sound? Sound only hears, eye only sees; by what sense do you compare? Is there any sense by which you can compare sight with hearing? It is something that is not sensed or there is a deeper sense in us. In Indian philosophy it is called the mind, not the sense, not the sense organs; it is the mind which compares. They say the mind is the sixth sense. It is not that the senses are compared by an inner sense which is the mind which is not outer sense it is an inner sense. So according to Plato wherever there is comparison this comparison is not done by perception.

Now comparison is important for knowledge. You cannot have true knowledge without the capacity to compare. So first is the comparison then knowledge of existence. I told you last time that you normally see objects which are existing but how do you perceive existence itself? For that you require to go beyond senses. It is by rational capacity that you perceive existence and third is the understanding of numbers. Now understanding numbers is a very peculiar thing. You all have learnt arithmetic, geometry, maybe algebra, maybe you have studied mathematics itself, higher mathematics is in fact higher mathematics is science of numbers and the question is what is number? I don’t know if you have ever thought about the question: what is a number? We know 1,2,3,4,5,6 these are called numbers but how do you know what is two except that one object and second object are put together but on this object and this object nobody has written two. So by sensation you don’t get the idea of two. It is because that these two objects are put together you call it two but supposing these objects were put separately then you would have not called them two. This is one object, this is another object both are one, one. When you put them together now you say its two but the word two is not written on anything; it’s not that you perceive two anywhere. What you perceive is this object and that object that’s all. If the same object was now put along with the third object you will now say it is three. The same thing is now called three. When it was only with this, you called it two, now you put a third thing and now the same thing you call now three. All three together are three. This was the theory of Pythagoras who came much before Plato. According to Pythagoras numbers are known not by senses but directly by reason because reason understands what is three–ness, what is two–ness, what is four–ness, what is five–ness. So the knowledge of numbers, the knowledge of existence and comparison these three things are not learnt by senses. We may use senses to begin with but when you reflect upon them you find that they are not perceived by senses. Similarity I told you, comparison between colour and sound neither your ear makes a comparison nor your eye makes a comparison because eye can only see and Ear can only hear but what is it that compares the sound and hearing; it must be something else other than the eye and the ear that which is something else is more than the senses similarly the knowledge of the existence. You see this object existing or that object existing but existence as such, what is existence as such? What is it to exist? This you conceive not perceive but you conceive. As I told you existence cannot be perceived it can be conceived, comparison cannot be perceived, comparison can only be conceived. Number cannot be seen, number is only conceived. These are three examples which Plato takes to show you that there is kind of a knowledge that is by conception not by perception and he says perception is not knowledge it is conception which gives you knowledge.

We speak, for instance, of two things being unequal but this presupposes an ideal of equality which is not derived from perception, since there are no two things exactly equal to each other.

This also is a very good example. We very often feel, you take two objects and measure them exactly equal and you feel that by seeing two equal things we have got the idea of equality but what you are seeing is one object and the other object. By what means are you comparing? How do you arrive at the idea of equality? It is something which is perceived, it is not perceivable, and it is conceived in the mind.

We know, for instance, that colour is different from sound, but there is no sense–organ which can perceive both. There must therefore be a faculty higher then sense–organs which is capable both of perceiving things directly without any aid or sense–organs as well as of making use of sense–organs. Moreover, an essential object of knowledge is existence, and this we do not perceive by sense–organs; it is the mind which directly reaches existence. Plato concludes that perception is not knowledge, because “it has not part in apprehending truth since it has none in apprehending existence.”

Senses do not give you knowledge because senses cannot give you the knowledge of existence and knowledge of existence is knowledge and not perception therefore he says that ‘perception is not knowledge’. Now we shall read this paragraph again because it’s a very important paragraph. What is written in this paragraph can remain with you throughout your life because very briefly it gives you the whole basis of an idea of what is called Pure Reason. As I told you human beings are supposed to be rational beings, we are rational because we make use of reason and if anybody says what is reason then the best answer that you can give is this paragraph. So to be a human being is to be rational, to be rational is to understand what is reason and to understand what is reason you should know the answer by reading this paragraph. So it is one of the most important things that we have been told by Plato, so we repeat it. Particulars are, according to Plato, the objects of perceptions, and perception, he contends, is not knowledge. In his dialogue ‘Theaetetus’, he points out that comparison, knowledge of existence and understanding of numbers are essential to knowledge but they cannot be perceived by senses.

We speak, for instance, of two things being unequal but this presupposes an ideal of equality which is not derived from perception, since there are no two things exactly equal to each other. We know, for instance, that colour is different from sound, but there is no sense–organ which can perceive both. There must therefore be a faculty higher than sense–organs which is capable both of perceiving things directly without any aid or sense–organs as well as of making use of sense–organs. Moreover, an essential object of knowledge is existence, and this we do not perceive by sense–organs; it is the mind which directly reaches existence. Plato concludes that perception is not knowledge, because “it has no part in apprehending truth since it has none in apprehending existence.” Fine. This paragraph you may have to read again not only now maybe after five years, maybe after ten years; I have been reading year after year and very often it is a very good exercise of the mind to be reminded that when you try to understand what is Reason these examples are of direct use. So you’ll make use of these examples again and again and you will reflect upon them again and again. Now: That which the higher faculty perceives directly is, according to Plato, the essential and universal element in the particular.

When you see a particular as I told you yesterday, every particular has got in it universals. When you say this cat is black, you are seeing two universals—cattiness and blackness. Without apprehending these two universals you could not make a statement—this cat is black. You must understand what is cattiness then only you can say this cat. Unless you know what is cattiness you cannot say this cat and you cannot say this is black unless you know what is blackness. So whenever you see any particular, every perception of particular involves a perception of universal. And to be very precise you should say every perception of a particular involves conception of universal. Universal is not perceived but is conceived. So whenever you see any particular, perception of the particular implies conception of universal.

This element he calls the Idea or the Form. Pertaining to each characteristic of a particular thing there is universal Idea by participating in which the particular thing is what it is.

According to Plato, particulars are copies of universals. This cat or that cat is a copy of the universal cat, the universal idea of a cat. Every particular is a kind of a distortion. It's not exactly the original universal, it’s like a copy, and every copy is a slight distortion from the original. So according to Plato universal is real and all particulars are not so real they are being, non–being and they are all copies of the universal and this copy happens because they participate in the original. It’s a copy because it participates in the original; it is derived from the original.

Pertaining to each characteristic of a particular thing there is universal Idea by participating in which the particular thing is what it is.

According to Plato, particulars are copies of universals. This cat is a copy of the universal cat, the universal idea of the cat. Every particular is a kind of a slight distortion, it's not exactly the original universal is like a copy every copy slight distortion from the original. So according to Plato universal is real and all particulars are not so real they are being non-being and they are all copies of the universal and this copy happens because it participates in the original it's a copy because it participates in the original it is derived from the original.

Indeed, each particular thing has many characteristics, and therefore each particular should be regarded as participating in many universal Ideas. A cat, for instance, partakes of the universal cattiness, but also of Beauty, Blackness and so on.

When you say a beautiful cat, how do you say it’s a beautiful cat? You have understood the idea of beauty, its universal, and this cat participates in that idea of beauty to some extent, a copy of that ideal beauty and therefore you say it is a beautiful, beautiful cat.

A particular cat may die but the universal Ideas of which it partakes are permanent; they are eternal. Supposing all the books of the world are destroyed but you can always make a new book. Why? Because there is a universal book, the universal idea of a book is bookness that is permanent. So this book may die or that book may die, this cat may die or that cat may die but the concept off the cat remains, the concept of the book remains permanent.

These Ideas are, according to Plato, typal or ideal.

Now this word ‘typal’ is very important. In fact there is also a word used ‘archetypal’. What is type? You can say this is typical, we use this expression very often, and this is typical of something. Typical is an example of a type. We all are typical of humanity, humanity is a type; cattiness is another type, dogness is another type every dog is typical of dogness, every cat is typical of cattiness, and every human being is typical of humanity. So in the whole world you will find everything is typical of some universal. Therefore universal is called the type and we all and other things are examples therefore they are called typical. These ideas are according to Plato typal or ideal.

Things of the world are copies of these Ideas; they reflect or imitate them and become what they are. But the original stuff of the particulars, the substance which imitates and reflects the Ideas, is Matter which is indefinable since it is something of the nature of non-being.

Now this sentence is a new sentence we have not spoken of until now. So I shall stop a little here. To make a copy of anything you require some substance. Suppose I ask you to copy out this paper now how do you make a copy of this paper? You have to have another paper on which you write it down. So apart from this you should have another substance on which you can make a copy. So according to Plato there is an idea or universal idea then there is another what he calls matter and it is on this matter that the idea is imprinted so it becomes a copy. Therefore, according to Plato, in any object in the world three elements are involved—the idea which is universal and permanent, matter which is the stuff on which idea is printed are copies; as a result the particular comes out, every particular copy requires a substance on which idea is printed. We are all human beings because the idea of humanity is imprinted on this body. You might say there is a huge piece of matter and every human being is a kind of piece of matter on which humanity is printed therefore we are human beings. If cattiness was printed on our body we would have become cats. It depends on which idea is printed upon us. So there is first an idea then there is matter and then by combination of the two you get particulars, the copies. Now what is the nature of matter? This is a question in Plato which has not been answered sufficiently well. The Idea is real and permanent; the copy is temporary, relative. What about matter? Is it permanent, is it relative or what is it, where does it come from? The copy comes from the universal but this matter by itself on which the copy is made where does this come from? This is a question, he says: it must be non–being because Idea is being, the copy is being, and non–being and this matter is non–being. But what is this non–being, non–being itself doesn’t exist? This is the question Plato has not been able to answer sufficiently well. We shall come back to this question afterwards because this is one of the deficiencies of Plato’s philosophy. When a philosopher is not able to answer a question properly you call it a defect of his philosophy. Even the greatest philosophers like Plato are not perfect; they can’t answer all the questions. There are some questions that are loosely answered he is not able to answer clearly very well. Non–being doesn’t exist if it doesn’t exist on which it is printed, the idea is printed on what? If it is a non–being it can’t be an object on which you can print. But certainly this matter is not that universal idea, surely nor is it by itself a print because the print takes place after the object is presented to it. So if this object is neither being nor non–being, then what is this? He is obliged to say it is non–being. But that which is and yet non–being that is hardly an answer. So this is the one area that Plato is not able to answer this question. This is the one question that you should keep in one corner of your mind and ask has any philosopher answered this question, if Plato has not answered this very satisfactorily is there any other philosopher who has answered this question. We shall discuss this question later on after finishing Plato. Is there any philosopher who has answered the question what is the stuff of which the particular is made? Particular has two aspects, copy of the universal and the stuff on which the copy is made but what is the nature of the stuff on which the copy is made? According to Plato it is non–being is to say it is stuff which is non–being if it doesn’t exist how can you make a print on it? This is self-contradiction but this is how he answers this question. There is lacuna in Plato’s philosophy at this point. So we repeat:

These Ideas are, according to Plato, typal or ideal; things of the world are copies of these Ideas; they reflect or imitate them and become what they are. But the original stuff of the particulars, the substance which imitates and reflects the Ideas, is Matter which is indefinable since it is something of the nature of non–being. It is a non–entity which, however, is.. This is self–contradiction but then this is how Plato says he cannot answer that question properly so he commits a self-contradiction.

It is a non–entity which, however, is and partakes of the universal Ideas. Particulars are not the manifestation of the universals, nor are universals made of the particulars; Ideas are self–existent and uncreated; the original stuff of the particulars too is self–existent and uncreated, but this self–existent is non–existent and attains to being only by partaking of the universal Ideas.

Now this sentence I have not explained to you I will leave it to you to explain to me after you have read it three, four times. Tomorrow I’ll ask you if you understood this sentence. But I’ll read this sentence once more.

Particulars are not the manifestation of the universals, nor are universals made of the particulars; Ideas are self–existent and uncreated; the original stuff of the particulars too is self–existent and uncreated, but this self–existent is non–existent and attains to being only by partaking of the universal Ideas.

Some of the great propositions of metaphysics are striking, paradoxical, they seem to be unintelligible, and they can’t be understood. This is one of those sentences, so we shall repeat once more.

Particulars are not the manifestation of the universals, nor are universals made of the particulars; Ideas are self–existent and uncreated; the original stuff of the particulars too is self–existent and uncreated, but this self–existent is non–existent and attains to being only by partaking of the universal Ideas.

As I said I’ll not explain this tomorrow we shall take up this when we start, reflect during the day what exactly this sentence means, reflect very leisurely without pressing your mind, no headache, the mind should be allowed very free leisure, allow this idea to repeat in your mind and see if it makes any meaning and we shall see tomorrow if we can make out what this sentence means. As I told you why I am dealing with Plato so much is that without understanding Plato you will not understand Western thought as a whole and what we are now studying is you might say the main substance of Plato, Plato is a very large thing, you know he has written thousands of pages and I have done for you a very small summary so that you don’t have to read at once that huge literature but if you study this little thing you enter into the heart and soul of Plato, you understand what Plato used to say and you can see how far what he says is intelligible to understand that work and how and where he becomes unintelligible. We can’t understand him and there is some kind of deficiency in what he says. So you can at once speak up if you read this sentence you will at once speak up where exactly Plato is not intelligible and therefore you can suspect that he is not right there is something which is not clicking properly. Right so we shall do it tomorrow.